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Citizenship and Displacement
Lyla Mehta and Rebecca Napier-Moore
Summary
Crucial for displaced people is citizenship (or the lack of it). In conventional
terms, citizenship is seen as political membership in a given nation-state
through which citizens possess civil, political, economic and social rights. Most
states, however, have groups within them who do not belong and are denied
citizenship rights, even though they may have formal citizenship. In particular,
displaced people (both within and crossing borders) are denied formal
citizenship and rights but are claiming them, subjectively seeing their de facto
experience as lived citizenship. Protest, claim assertion and transnational
alliances are manifest ways of struggling for those rights. Much of the existing
literature tends to focus top-down understandings of displaced people as
citizens/non-citizens and the formal processes available (or not available) to
them, ignoring the importance of informal processes as well as local agency
and practice. This paper explores the informal processes and feelings of
belonging through case study examples, linking them to changing dynamics in
different displacement regimes (e.g. refugee, IDP – internally displaced people
– and DID – (development-induced displacement). We look at impacts of
globalisation and changing international and national legal structures to
bottom-up and lived notions of citizenship. The paper also examines
displacement in light of differing theoretical meanings of citizenship, asking to
what extent the forced migrant is a global or transnational citizen.
Keywords: forced displacement; citizenship; rights; displaced people;
globalisation; local mobilisation.
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There is nothing more unsettling than
the continual movement of something that seems fixed.
Gilles Deleuze
Modern politics is a spatial politics. Its crucial condition
of possibility is the distinction between an inside and
an outside, between citizens, nations and
communities within and enemies, others and absences without.
Rob Walker
Arjun Appadurai talks of different ‘scapes’ to describe the new global world. By
ethnoscapes he is referring to:
Landscapes of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live:
tourists, immigrants, refugees, guest workers and other moving groups and
persons constitute the essential feature of the world, and appear to affect
the politics of and between nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree.
This is not to say that there are not anywhere relatively stable communities
and networks, of kinship, friendship, of work and of leisure, as well as of
birth, residence and other filiative forms. But this is to say that the warp of
these stabilities is everywhere shot through with the woof of human motion,
as more persons and groups deal with the realities of having to move, or
the fantasies of wanting to move.
(Appadurai 1991: 191–2)
Indeed, mobility, displacement and emplacement have become defining
features of our times. As long as there are wars and large scale development
projects, forced uprootedness is here to stay. At the end of 2009, UNHCR
recorded 43.3 million people who were forcibly displaced worldwide, of which
15.2 million were refugees, with the rest as asylum seekers with cases
pending, and internally displaced peoples, or IDPs (UNHCR 2010). This paper
examines the implications for citizenship of various forms of displacement.
While there is a big literature on displacement and citizenship, it tends to focus
on top-down understandings of displacement and citizenship. Instead, few
people are asking how displaced people are viewing their own citizenship and
struggling for the rights that they see as theirs. This paper aims to move away
IDS WORKING PAPER 354
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from the normative view of displaced people and their rights, as viewed by
governments and inter-governmental bodies who tend to have a ‘sedentarist’
(Malkki 1992) lens. Instead, we focus on how displaced people themselves
understand their predicament and how they develop ways of coping with their
problematic or non-citizenship status. We investigate formal and informal
processes of rights claiming and expressions of local agency exercised by a
range of displaced people. These responses can be seen as a form of ‘lived
citizenship’ and include attempts by non-citizens to pressure the state, NGOs
and international bodies to respond to their rights and interests. We also
attempt to understand how globalisation is accelerating displacement
processes and whether displaced people can be seen to embody new forms of
global or transnational citizenship. We thus investigate the limits and
possibilities of new forms of ‘postnational’ and denationalised or
deterritorialised citizenship.
We intentionally take a broad view to displacement. We thus focus on
refugees, IDPs and those affected by development-induced displacement
(DID). Whenever relevant, we focus on other non citizens such as immigrants
and undocumented workers who are denied basic rights of citizenship in their
new countries of residence. In this case, the distinction between voluntary and
forced migration may be very blurred. Forced migration research has tended to
separate out different categories of displacement and there are the purists who
think forced migration research should only focus on refugees. We use rights
and citizenship as a way to bridge divides about different forms of
displacement (see also Grabska and Mehta 2008). We also look at a range of
displacement contexts and causes because each offers different insights about
displacement/citizenship linkages as well as lessons that can be learned
between different strands of research in forced displacement studies.
Traditionally, studies on refugees and displaced people (both oustees and
IDPs) have rarely spoken to each other. In part this has to do with differences
in the causes of impoverishment, the massive institutional differences in the
major agencies dealing with refugees, IDPs and oustees as well as who
assumes responsibility for the successful resettlement and rehabilitation/
integration of forced migrants, which we describe shortly.
There are also differences in claims to entitlements. Legislative frameworks
(international laws, human rights laws, legislations, conventions and treaties)
embrace protection for refugees, based on the framework of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948)1 and specific conventions such as the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Under international law,
states are obliged to protect non-citizens and those residing within their
national borders, including refugees, who often cannot claim entitlements from
1 In 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) which was virtually endorsed by all states. It is premised on the inherent dignity and worth of
all human persons, regardless of background, class, race etc. It is constituted by the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which has 160 parties and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Right (ICESCR), which has 156 parties (as of April 2007, UNHCR
2007).
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host states due to the denial of basic rights). This is the crux of the distinction
between refugees and IDPs, whose status, even if they flee their homes for the
same reasons as refugees, is defined and protected by the legal frameworks of
their own nation. Thus refugees have the protection of international law that
IDPs lack even though they might be affected by similar conditions resulting
from violence, violations of human rights, and natural or human-made
disasters. The state is both the violator and protector of IDPs’ and oustees’s
rights. Still, there is a lot of scope for comparative research through several
substantive matters such as policy frameworks, rights and entitlements,
experiences of citizenship, forms of resistance and mobilisation and local
perceptions of rights and citizenship. In all cases, there are problems
concerning definitions and the official labels used to categorise displaced
people, a major focus on this paper.
To demonstrate how displaced people are living citizenship and negotiating the
complex realities that confront them, we draw on an actor-oriented lens that
‘privileges the experiences of the poor and marginalised groups and their own
understandings of rights, but without denying the importance of formal sources
of rights. The approach enables the pushing of the boundaries of formal legality
when this is necessary for justice’ (Nyamu-Musembi 2005: 48). We also look at
de facto versus de jure citizenship experiences, and informal versus formal
rights realisation. The subjective is important here, because as Kabeer notes,
‘while the idea of citizenship is now nearly universal, ideas about citizenship
are not, and never have been’ (Kabeer 2006: 91). Displaced people are very
often struggling for rights that they see as important, enacting them, making
them real, with or without a state’s official consent. Formal notions of
citizenship and rights very much affect displaced people in terms of labelling
them as deserving or undeserving of certain citizenship rights. Thus, we must
look at two levels, inclusion and exclusion from formal rights, and, importantly,
at whether those definitions of formal rights are what displaced people want.
‘Seeing like a citizen’ to use John Gaventa’s phrase, means taking seriously
that displaced people often want a different combination of rights than what
states or international bodies offer or define for them (Gaventa 2005). Too often
‘the formal notion of citizenship… contradicts, or is marginal to other forms of
membership that may matter more’ (Kabeer 2006: 91). We look at different
definitions of citizenship: as membership, as quasi-citizenship, as multiple
citizenships, and of course as global citizenship.
In this paper we thus focus on a range of examples of displaced peoples’
struggles and demonstrate how attempts to push those formal boundaries have
met with varying success (for example refugee protests in Egypt and Ghana
and protest against dam-based displacement in India). In recent years, there
has been increased media focus on displaced people openly protesting for
their rights (Harrell-Bond 2008). But what do these protests mean in terms of
citizenship struggles? In some cases they are demands for rights within the
country of residence. In others, they are protests on a supra-national level,
aiming to affect the World Bank or home and third country policies towards
them. Given the supra-national element of these protests and the international
element of much displacement, this paper examines the concept of global or
transnational citizenship.
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This paper begins with a discussion of how the character of displacement (and
its international management) is shifting. It then moves to formal definitions of
citizenship and challenges to these top-down notions from displaced people.
We demonstrate how displaced people are claiming rights and creating new
understandings of citizenship. We then explore biases of civil and political,
versus social and economic rights as well as Eurocentric biases of citizenship/
displacement. Finally we end by exploring whether displaced people and
refugees in particular are the only true transnational and/or global citizens.
1 The shifting character of
displacement
Forced uprootedness is here to stay. At the end of 2009, UNHCR recorded
43.3 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, the highest number since the
mid 1990s. Of these 15.2 were refugees, with 10.4 million falling under
UNHCR’s responsibility and 4.8 Palestinian refugees under UNRWA’s
mandate. The figure also includes 983,000 asylum seekers and 27.1 million
(IDPs). Afghan and Iraqi refugees, the victims of so-called wars on terror,
accounted for almost half of all refugees under UNHCR’s responsibility
worldwide (UNHCR 2010).
While the international development community has largely been concerned
with refugees crossing borders, there is increased recognition that we must
also pay attention to IDPs who experience refugee-like situations and
conditions in their own countries. Further people are also displaced due to
infrastructure projects built for ‘development’ purposes, such as mines, dams
and roads and more recently due to so-called land grabs and land deals which
are displacing many thousands of people across Asia, Africa and Latin
America. Often known as oustees, these people are affected by
Development-Induced Displacement (DID).2 Unfortunately, there are no recent
estimates for DID; the last estimate in 1997 conservatively cited 10 million
people annually were affected by DID (Cernea 1997).
While UNHCR’s numbers of people of concern to the agency increase or
decrease depending on the year, what is interesting to note is that people are
remaining displaced (at least in camps) for longer periods of time. Protracted
refugee camps are defined by UNHCR as circumstances in which groups of
25,000 refugees are in host developing countries for five or more years.3 Some
5.5 million refugees were in a protracted situation in 2009, living in 21 different
countries. Longer time as refugees means longer time without citizenship
2 The term ‘oustee’ is borrowed from the Indian literature on displacement and resettlement, where it is
commonly used to describe people ‘ousted’ from their habitat through government intervention,
generally for the purpose of some development-required change in land or water use (see Mehta and
Gupte 2003). The term oustee is preferable to ‘development-induced displaced’ people or ‘resettlers’
since the latter terms do not highlight the unjust and coercive nature of forced uprooting.
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rights, and/or longer time in which to settle in and informally make claim to
rights in the host country. Many refugee camps, for instance, turn into small
cities with booming economic centres, which can be a realisation of economic
rights for many. Other camps, and the marginalised areas of economically-
active camps, can remain without those for a very long time.
With respect to DID, globalisation’s acceleration of international capital flows
and economic liberalisation is likely to increase the number of ‘development’
projects – many of which are displacing people to build dams, roads, mines,
etc. In India alone since the 1947 independence, 21 to 50 million people or
oustees have been displaced by large projects (see Hemadri et al. 2000).
Globalisation, despite all its gains for some, also increases inequalities,
causing many to move to urban centres and the richer North in order to secure
livelihoods and incomes. People displaced or threatened to be displaced by
development often fight against development projects, and once displaced,
they have another struggle ahead of them for rights in their new area of
displacement.
Due to intractable conflicts, about 11 million people lack citizenship or effective
nationality worldwide (Frelick and Lynch 2005). This violates Article 15 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights that upholds that every person ‘has a
right to a nationality’ (ibid.). In international human rights instruments, they are
accorded a whole host of rights on par with citizens. They have been detained,
and their rights have been violated due to host country fears of terrorism.
Stateless persons are rarely counted in official government statistics as a
resident category. Examples include: about 250,000 Biharis or ‘stranded
Pakistanis’ languishing in Bangladeshi camps since the early 1970s. Both
Pakistan and Bangladesh refuse to offer them citizenship; two million so called
‘hill tribes’ in Thailand who lack Thai citizenship are denied basic rights such as
the right to vote, buy land, get jobs even though they were born in the country;
millions of Palestinians who are both stateless and refugees. Unlike refugees
and IDPs, stateless people do not benefit from the protection and assistance of
governments, donors and the UN. They are ‘international orphans’ (ibid.: 24).
The above discussion is one of a worsening problem in terms of longer camps,
globalisation that likely will increasingly cause displacement, and large
numbers of stateless people, many of whom are experiencing rights violations
due to fears of terrorism, or simply state control. These are all discussions of
peoples who have been labelled under various international displacement
categories. Next we look at the power of those categories, for inclusion,
exclusion and the granting of rights.
3 These UNHCR statistics exclude Palestinian refugees, who fall under the separate mandate of
UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East)
(UNHCR 2004: 2).
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1.1 Global labels for displacement
The power of categorisation and awarding status to displaced people is linked
to the ‘right’ to have ‘rights’. The labels ‘refugee,’ ‘oustee’ and ‘IDP’ are
controversial, especially when it comes to policy formulation (see Gupte and
Mehta 2007). As argued by Zetter (1988), the label of refugee, for instance,
both stereotypes and institutionalises a certain status. Although the label claims
to be apolitical, through law and policymaking, it establishes highly politicised
interpretations (Wood 1985). Due to the strict requirements for refugee status
provided in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the
1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects
of Refugee Problems in Africa, being granted the status is difficult for most
forced migrants. In fact, the strict legal criteria and status determination
procedures often employed by either host governments or carried out by the
UNHCR on behalf of the governments mean that many remain outside the
protection of international refugee law. Hence, we question these narrow
legalistic definitions and adopt a more encompassing definition of refugees,
including those who either have officially applied for refugee status in the
country of asylum or who do not feel safe to return to their country of origin.
Following Malkki’s (1992) definition, the term refugee should not be seen
exclusively in the context of the country-of-origin experiences which lead an
individual or a group to flee, leaving him or her with a sense of loss (in terms of
protection, social networks, and material property). Rather, the dynamic aspect
of the refugee experience must be taken into account, whereby one becomes a
refugee not only by escaping violence and persecution and crossing an
international border, but also by going through the process of seeking asylum,
as part of evolving relationships, networks, and personal developments (Al
Sharmani 2003).
The category ‘displaced person’ or ‘forced migrant’ also designates crisis and
associated conditions of poverty and marginalisation. Often the label implies
‘burden’ and imposes an institutionalised dependency (Zetter 1988, 1985). At
the same time, however, the category ‘refugee’ or ‘displaced person’
establishes rights and entitlements guaranteed under universal human rights
and other relevant regimes. For example, illegality and lack of refugee status
mean limited and disadvantaged access to jobs,4 lack of access to education
for children,5 lack of access to health services, and the inability for refugees to
claim their other rights in the host society,6 including freedom of movement.7
Rights, however, are granted to refugees temporarily, pending one of the
durable solutions to the refugee ‘problem’.8
4 The 1951 Convention lists a number of rights which should be guaranteed for refugees by the host
government. The following articles refer to the right to work in the country of asylum: Art. 17 re: wage-
earning employment, Art. 18 re: self-employment, Art. 19 re: liberal professions, Art. 13 re: moveable
and immovable property, and Art. 14 re: artistic rights and industrial property.
5 Art. 22 guarantees access to public education for refugee children and Art.23 deals with the access to
public relief.
6 Art. 3 addresses the issue of non-discrimination and Art. 16 talks about the access to courts.
IDS WORKING PAPER 354
13
The situation for those who have been given a label of internally displaced
(IDPs) is even more legally controversial. As people who have not crossed an
international border, IDPs remain under the sovereignty of their governments
and hence, under their protection. In 1998, the UN Representative on internally
displaced persons issued Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.9 Even
though they are not a binding legal document, they are based on and
consistent with international human rights law, humanitarian and refugee law.
Unlike the protection accorded to refugees, the ‘Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement’ contain only recommendations (Deng and Cohen 1998) with
respect to the protection of the rights and entitlements of those involuntarily
displaced due to development projects or conflict situations. There are not legal
obligations on states to protect IDPs.
The label, thus, not only categorises. It excludes, and, with this exclusion,
displaced people’s basic rights are denied. These issues indicate several
contradictions and a disjuncture between the idea of global obligations and
universal declarations to secure rights and the local means to achieve them.
The label, thus, not only categorises. It excludes, and, with this exclusion,
displaced people’s basic rights are denied (Gupte and Mehta 2007). For
example, people who live in the downstream areas of dams may have their
right to livelihood infringed once a reservoir is dammed, putting their fishing
livelihoods at risk. Others may want recognition for their rights in customary law
and thus seek compensation for their usufruct rights over trees and the forest.
But such groups are not considered to be ‘project affected persons’, and they
are denied compensation. Thus, resistance on the part of displaced people and
their allies in NGOs and activists is often about inclusion by category or a
struggle for compensation from which they were otherwise excluded. There are
large differences in the standards of global agencies, as well as in the ways
they are implemented at the local level. But global standards are also used by
displaced people in their struggles. In Napier-Moore’s experience in camps in
Uganda and Ghana, many displaced people are familiar with various legal
frameworks and use them to demand a range of services from international
agencies or states. In both Ghana and Uganda, for example, knowledge about
the voluntariness of refugee repatriation and IDP return is mentioned often.
Suleiman describes that Palestinian refugees use the label of refugee to their
advantage in advocacy for their rights. He says ‘they would not give up the
legal status of ‘refugee’ because it is perceived by them as “an asset in the
battle to survive”’ (Peteet quoted in Suleiman 2008: 95).
There are massive institutional differences in the major agencies dealing with
different categories of displaced people.10 UNHCR, for instance, is not
7 Two articles mentioned in the Convention address the issue of freedom of movement, including Art. 26
directly talking about freedom of movement and Art. 28 dealing with travel documents.
8 According to the UNHCR, there are three possible outcomes: voluntary repatriation, local integration
or resettlement to a third country.
9 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement form UN document E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, dated 11
February 1998.
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10 Refugees are categorised under the Refugee Settlement Commission of the League of Nations,
UNRWA and UNHCR. IDPs institutionally fall within remits of UNHCR (only recently), UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and national governments. Oustees/DID rights are to be
met by the World Bank, regional banks such as the Asian Development Bank, national governments
and regional resettlement agencies.
supposed to provide direct assistance, but lobby and advocate for rights to be
met, while the UNRWA has the opposite mandate working for Palestinians.
Agencies such as the Refugee Settlement Commission of the League of
Nations also work for refugees together with UNHCR and host countries. IDPs
are taken care of by UNHCR, the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and national governments. And oustee concerns
are dealt with by the World Bank and regional banks such as the Asian
Development Bank who provide funding to large projects, national governments
and regional resettlement agencies.
Under international law, states are obliged to protect non-citizens and those
residing within their national borders, including refugees. IDPs and oustees, on
the other hand, even if they flee their homes for the same reasons as refugees,
are to be protected by their own nation – often the violator of rights in the first
place, even though UNHCR has recently expanded its mandate to focus on
IDPs. Oustees are displaced by the same state who is supposed to restore
their livelihoods, rights and original standard of living. The international
conventions and agreements that were designed for displaced people
guarantee a smattering of different rights, which sometimes do and sometimes
do not overlap with formal citizenship rights in countries of displacement. We
turn now to look at what citizenship means in both internal and international
displacement.
2 Layers of exclusion from formally
defined citizenship
According to Nyers (2007), the practices of the state are premised on the
normality of citizenship and the state. But they also produce the ‘accident’ of
the refugee (ibid.) and we could add the migrant, the IDP and the oustee.
Globally, the movements of refugees are seen to be a problem. Refugees,
displaced from ‘authentic political identities, communities of citizenship, etc. are
seen as a temporary aberration to the norm, as hiccups that disturb “the
national order of things”’ (Malkki quoted in Nyers 2007: 9). But as Nyers
(2007), Malkii (2002) and Tuitt (2008) argue, their disturbance is precisely the
catalyst and foil that induced states to make their boundaries and identity firm,
using the displaced/out-of-place person as the marker for what defines the
outsider and what defines the insider. Traditional definitions of citizenship are
premised on making these boundaries clear. But as we shall see below, the
reality is that there are layers in relationship to formal citizenship, rather than a
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binary of citizenship and non-citizenship. And, we have not yet even begun
talking about how displaced people see those layers and whether they agree
with those formal definitions. First, however, we must be clear about the formal
definitions.
2.1 Traditional definitions of citizenship
In conventional terms, citizenship is seen to be political membership in a given
nation-state through which citizens possess civil, political and social rights. In
migration literature, citizenship is traditionally bound to the status of being a
‘national’ – which is particularistic and exclusive. Traditionally, access to
citizenship (that was bound up with nationality) took place in three ways: ius
sanguinis (law of the blood as in Germany, Greece), based on descent from a
national of the country and ius soli (law of the soil), which is based on birth in
the country questioned (e.g. USA, Australia). In practice, both laws of blood
and laws of the soil prevail. In addition, ius domicili (law of residence) serves
as a way in which people may gain an entitlement to citizenship through
residence in the territory of the country. The rules and practices of
naturalisation differ from country to country. Dual citizenship, though
increasing, is still a major political issue in the UK, Germany, India and
elsewhere. One citizenship per person is the norm. Immigrants who reside in a
country legally for many years often obtain special status concerning
residence, the right to work, employment, protection from deportation,
entitlements to social security etc. Often referred to as ‘denizens’ or ‘quasi
citizens’ (Hammar 1990) – such people are foreign citizens with legal and
permanent resident status. Hammar’s concept of denizens illustrates that there
are stages of citizenship. Rather than an all or nothing situation, the concept of
denizens is of people formally having some but not all citizenship rights (1990).
In 1987, Hammar posed, more than half the foreign resident population of
western Europe were denizens. In India’s Northeast, the homelands discourse
makes denizens and perpetual foreigners out of ethnically defined outsiders
and children (see Box 2.1). Such discourses and rules fuel exclusionary politics
and also legitimise ethnic violence and constant displacements.
However, millions are not lucky enough to have the level of rights that Hammar
conceptualised for denizens or quasi citizens. These include illegal workers,
unauthorised family entrants, asylum seekers, asylum seekers who have not
yet been deported, people living in camps and so on. These have been called
‘margizens’ by Martiniello (1994). Margizens may enjoy civil rights and legal
protection and even some social rights (as is the case for some asylum
seekers in some countries), but not permanent residence and security in that.
Jaber Suleiman is a Palestinian refugee and activist in Lebanon. He writes of
his status as a margizen:
Unlike most liberal democracies, where rights are linked to permanent
residency, in Arab countries including Lebanon, the right to citizenship is
considered as the primary right from which other basic rights are derived.
Despite our protracted refuge in Lebanon, Palestinian refugees lack a
separate legal status that distinguishes them from ‘foreigners’ and grants
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them the basic human rights in accordance with the provisions of
applicable international norms and standards. (2008: 94)
Large scale migration, as well as the host of reasons that will continue to
compel people to flee and move, suggest that there is no turning back to an
ideal of a state with a bounded and sedentary group of citizens, and it is best
to expand the notion of citizenship. The division of people into full citizens,
denizens and margizens perpetuates racism and social tensions, drawing lines
and labelling insiders as differentiated from people with partial or no rights
(Castles and Davidson 2000: 101). Box 2.1 looks at inclusion and
exclusion for displaced people and specially protected ethnic groups. Special
protection for one group may ironically mean exclusion for another. Thus,
inclusion becomes the crux, as labelling in a category often is what displaced
people want or need in their struggle to claim rights. Box 2.1 and the
discussion later in this paper look at different criterion in these citizenship and
rights-determining categories. Should citizenship be based on ethnic, territorial
or other lines?
Box 2.1 Inclusion and exclusion: North East India
From the Citizenship DRC and elsewhere, we know that most nations
have groups who do not belong and are denied citizenship rights, even
though they may have formal citizenship. Let us look at the case of North
East India. Alone North East India has about 157,000 displaced persons
(Baruah 2003). A large number of ‘tribal people’ or adivasis live in these
areas. In these areas, the rights of non-adivasis to land ownership and
exchange, business and access to elected offices are restricted. Many of
these areas, erstwhile enclaves, are now states, such as Meghalaya,
where nearly 85 per cent of public employment is reserved for the Khasis
(adivasis). The notion of protected ‘enclaves’ emerged in colonial times,
largely after a phase of enormous violence on so-called savage tribes.
Often it came too late and also raised questions concerning the rights of
non-aboriginal people living in such areas. Besides, social trans-
formations have attracted outsiders such as Bangladeshis to the region.
The North East of India is thus characterised by displacements, and
divisive politics between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.
According to Upendra Baxi, post colonial India has achieved ‘national
integration without achieving national integrity’ (quoted in Baruah 2003:
56). Baxi is referring to massive migrant labour from destitute parts of the
region and country, virtually ‘subjects without rights,’ who have been
responsible for the construction of ‘monumental state projects’ all over
India. In the Northeast, it is Bangladeshis and Nepalis who have met the
growing labour demands for the building boom and for new economic
roles emerging after shifting cultivation.
The Booker winning novel The Inheritance of Loss by Kiran Desai, nicely
captures the contradictions in both entitlements for ethnically defined
groups and the logic and norms of Indian citizenship in the North East. In
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the novel, Gyan, the Nepali tutor betrays his girlfriend, Sai, to join an
Indian-Nepali insurgency and asserts his identity as a ‘Gorkha’ (a term
used for ethnic Indian Nepalis). In the midst of all the demonstrations,
Biju, the cook’s son, an undocumented dishwasher in Manhattan who
constantly escapes from the INS, returns ‘home’ without his passport.
And Swiss Father Booty is forced to ‘return’ to Switzerland, stripped of
his land, cows and property, despite having lived for 40 years in the hilly
tract around Darjeeling.
Indeed, the North East has been the site for both development-
induced-displacement of adivasis and conflict-induced displacement
(e.g. the Chakmas displaced in Arunachal Pradesh; Bengalis and tribes
in Tripura; the Santhals, descendents of tea workers brought to Assam as
indentured labourers). Baruah argues that as economic and ethnic
landscapes are more complex, traditionally unprotected groups are
demanding the same kind of protection once extended to groups that
were isolated (2003: 60). In such a context, there is a need to rethink
conventional understandings of citizenship. He argues for the need for a
kind of dual citizenship (i.e. citizenship both of India and of a state). The
aim would be to ‘replace the ethnic principle with a civil principle and to
give the right to define the rules of inclusion and exclusion to territorially
defined political communities (2003: 62).’
We also see the case of stateless Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as a
significant example of displaced people whose formal rights in Lebanon have
gradually been worn away by the state over their many years in exile. Right to
own property and to work, for instance, continue to decline with decree after
decree, changing previous laws. As argued by Suleiman:
Despite the fact that Decree 927 refers specifically to ‘Palestinian
refugees’, Lebanese legislators make no attempts to distinguish us from
foreigners. Ordinance 319 of August 1962, which regulates the situation of
foreigners in Lebanon, considers Palestinian refugees as one of five
classifications of foreigners, that is, a ‘special category of foreigners’,
despite our protracted residence in the country and our exile as refugees.
So on the one hand we are denied basic rights that Lebanon granted to its
nationals, and on the other we are not guaranteed the refugee rights
accepted and recognized in relevant international instruments.’
(Suleiman 2008: 103)
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3 Challenges to the conventional
definitions of citizenship
Displaced people, in particular refugees, are a problem to conventional
definitions of citizenship. They break the state-nation-territory triad that
conventionally and formally defines citizenship in refugees’ home and host
states (Nyers 2007: 41). Refugees are nation-state citizens, but they have fled
its territory. Their belonging is thrown into question in both home and host
countries. Refugees have a twofold lack with respect to citizenship. Without
citizenship in host states, they are denied not only political rights but also the
capacity to speak politically and the right to be heard. In many parts of the
world, host countries fail to live up to international human rights standards as
well as basic provisions of the Refugee Convention that they have signed.
Hannah Arendt sees refugees representing a problem not of geographical/
territorial but of political space. They are people denied rights because they are
denied access to a political space that allows for a meaningful political
presence (see Nyers 2007). Being a refugee thus becomes an aberration. This
is because conventional understandings of citizenship are made out to be the
only authentic political identity of modern political life. The aberration to political
space caused by refugees is our first break in conventional notions of
citizenship.
IDPs and sometimes DIDs also break the state-nation-territory trinity. They
remain within the territory, but the nation-state might not consider them part of
it, and more importantly they might not consider themselves part of the
nation-state. Francis Deng, former Representative of the UN Secretary-General
on Internally Displaced Persons, commented in a recent speech that in his
contact with IDPs and their governments, it was not uncommon to hear IDPs
say that those in power were ‘not our leaders’, and to hear government leaders
say that IDPs were ‘not my people’ (2003: 5). The political space here is also
ruptured, and we can see territory beginning to crumble as a determiner of
citizenship rights.
Growing international mobility generally – in addition to forced displacement –
changes to notions of ‘cultural homogeneity’, and the fact that millions of
people have multiple citizenships and split lives, have also challenged the
conventional notions of citizenship and belonging. This suggests new rules of
conviviality. Castles and Davidson argue for dissolving the ‘nation part’ of the
nation state (2000: viii). This should be replaced with flexible and open
belonging and a democratic state. Citizenship should be derived from
residence on a states territory, cultural participation and economic involvement.
It should no longer be determined by belonging to certain cultural groups. In
the ideal world, this would solve the IDP problem described above. Yet, this
argument begs questions of political involvement for refugees, for instance,
who have crossed international borders but are still active, or think it is their
right to still be active, in home country politics. Tibetan refugees protesting
against the Chinese government from India, France or Nepal are doing so as
part of belonging to what Castles and Davidson say are cultural (rather than
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territorial) groups. Rainer Baubock talks of ‘external citizenship’, in terms of
right to return, external voting rights, as well as in terms of citizenship duties of
military service, taxes and compulsory voting (2007). Similarly Giles Mohan,
describes a situation in which residents of a country ask: You do not pay taxes
or get conscripted into the army, why should you vote? And the Diaspora voice
responds: But we have poured tons of money into the country, and only
10–14 per cent of residents pay taxes regularly anyway (2006). While it does
work from the host country perspective to be highly inclusive of the people
therein, territory based citizenship overlooks the displaced person’s multiple
conceptions of citizenship and what some people think is their right to continue
citizenship participation in home countries. Saskia Sassen argues that the
destabilising of hierarchies of power of the nation-state have led to new
political forces and actors which signal a ‘de-territorializing of citizenship
practices and identities’ (2004: 191).
Transformations inside the national state have also led to changes in the
institutions of citizenship. She thus distinguishes between postnational
citizenship and denationalised forms of citizenship (2004: 192). We can say
that both geographical and political space notions in traditional citizenship do
not hold up anymore without significant challenges to them.
Globalisation’s effects on displacement have also contributed to new problems
and challenges to citizenship. Brysk and Shafir (2004) argue that globalisation
has created a ‘citizenship gap which puts noncitizens and ‘second class
citizens’ at risk (2004: 3). So the margizens and the denizens, described in the
section above, cannot even rely on the few rights they thought they formally
had. Globalisation can be seen as the acceleration and intensification of flows
(cultural, financial, of people, information and so on). As described above,
states play a key role in interpreting and enforcing citizenship based on
combinations of birth, descent, residency, cultural characteristics and so on.
But according to Brysk and Shafir (ibid.), globalisation intensifies these
discrepancies and disparities and the numbers of people in dual or overlapping
status. It has led to a growing number of noncitizens – migrants, refugees,
IDPs whose lives are affected by market trends, conflicts and policies in the
North that impact unfavourably on Southern lives and livelihoods. The forces of
economic globalisation have also lead to widening disparities and a lowering of
welfare standards (e.g. basic services can be threatened due to privatisation
and SAP programmes, jobs are lost due to foreign take-overs and so on).
Consequently, many more so-called ‘economic’ migrants emerge who face
increasing restrictions to work in richer countries. However, globalisation has
also created direct or indirect pressures on states to harmonise their standards
with international ones. Consumer pressure on corporations is also asking the
private sector to take initiative on solving some problems. Thus, while
globalisation intensifies a gap, it can also lead to a universalism of human
rights standards that could potentially address the gap (we turn to this issue in
the section on local/global linkages).
Why is this important? Refugees, IDPs and DIDs, increasing mobility, as well
as economic and cultural globalisation have questioned the traditional role of
the nation-state and the notion of distinct and untouched cultures, bounded
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within territory. This seems to suggest that the nation state as a reference point
of citizenship has to change. Globalisation and increasing mobility are a
positive feedback loop, seemingly reinforcing each other, leading to new
feelings of cultural and political belonging (e.g. voting in two countries for
migrants; dual citizenship and so on). New forms of citizenship have emerged
(for instance, multiculturalism as in Canada and citizenship through
supra-national institutions and practices as in ECOWAS (The Economic
Community Of West African States) or EU membership). We now turn to look at
new forms of citizenship. After all, as Schotter asks ‘Is citizenship a useful
concept for exploring the problems of belonging, identity and personality in the
modern world?’ (quoted in Sassen 2004: 195).
4 Displaced people claiming rights
and creating new understandings
of citizenship
There are growing acknowledgements of the failure of ‘equal citizenship’ –
rendered visible through processes of claim-making on the part of
refugees/immigrants etc. Displaced people’s actions call for new under-
standings of citizenship. Indeed displaced people’s actions are defining those
new understandings. Box 4.1, for instance, describes IDPs in Sri Lanka
forgoing formal citizenship so that they can instead be under the IDP label that
guarantees their right to food, which they think is more important than the
rights they would get under citizenship registration. This is a strong message
about what they think about the worth of formal citizenship, and about the need
to be labelled in a particular way in order that they might make real an
important right to food. Similarly Palestinian, Jaber Suleiman, describes the
demand for the Right to Return, rather than the demand for citizenship in exile.
See Box 4.2.
Much of the literature tends to focus on top-down understandings of displaced
people as citizens/non-citizens and the formal processes available (or not) to
them. There is a noticeable silence about agency-driven citizenship amongst
displaced people (especially in the global South). Through the Citizenship DRC
we know that citizenship is often realised through struggle, through making
claims and asserting entitlements to rights. We now go onto demonstrate how
displaced people are realising rights without having access to formal
citizenship and rights and how they are participating in efforts to have formal
rights granted and then abuse of rights stopped, some of this through
transnational alliances across global-local spaces. All these lead to new
understandings of citizenship.
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Box 4.1 Rejecting formal citizenship to claim rights under the
IDP label
Brun (2003) demonstrates in Sri Lanka how being an IDP leads to a
different status that is not legal but also denies people their citizenship
rights. IDPs cannot claim additional rights to those shared with their
compatriots. This is because they are not registered as citizens or not
considered to be ‘local citizens’ (i.e. residents within a district or
province). The movement of IDPs within a country challenges traditional
understandings of citizenship – this is because access to rights emerges
as highly unequal. IDPs are not recognised as full members of
communities. About 75,000 Northern Muslims were expelled by the LTTE
(Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) from their homes in the North but the
Sri Lanka state is not able to provide for them in the South. Most citizens
in Sri Lanka can register as residents or ‘local citizens’ in a province or
after living there for six months, but this has not worked for Northern
Muslims, despite having bought land. In part, many Muslims do not want
to register. This is because they may lose their IDP status which means
losing their right to rations and/or receiving assistance to return home to
the North. Thus, they are willing to sacrifice citizenship/resident rights in
the interest of rations. Food, a social and economic right, is too often not
included in formal definitions of citizenship rights, though some IDPs in
Sri Lanka obviously consider it a more important right and have decided
to make sure they can continue realising/receiving it.
Box 4.2 Palestinians demanding the Right to Return, rather than
citizenship rights in host countries
‘[T]he Palestinian community in Lebanon is not looking for citizenship,
and its demand for basic human rights does not entail the right to
citizenship. In fact, the right of return is the highest priority for Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon. But obtaining basic human rights while in exile
would serve to mitigate our destitution and alleviate our day-to-day
suffering. Thus, in order to accommodate our isolation and neglect, we
are seeking greater economic, social and cultural rights in the local
Lebanese context’ (Suleiman 2008: 95).
4.1 Realising rights… informally
Authors like Sassen (2004) have demonstrated that in situations where formal
citizenship is not available to refugees and non-citizens it can be observed that
they engage in the same practices as formally defined citizens. Thus, informal
social contracts emerge between the ‘community’ and non-citizens. Sassen, for
example, talks about multiple meanings of citizenship on the part of
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undocumented workers in the US where groups earn citizenship claims
(e.g. membership in a community, participation in civic activities). Sassen also
talks of how marginalised groups move between powerlessness and the
condition of being an actor, thus acquiring a presence in a broader political
process. This presence entails the possibility of a politics that while centred in
specific localities is transnational.
While Sassen is talking about undocumented migrants, a category which often
(but not necessarily) includes displaced people, Kibreab (2008) gives a similar
scenario when talking about Eritrean refugees in his research on decisions to
repatriate or stay in Sudan, the country of asylum. He shows that though
denied formal rights from the Sudanese government, through social networks
with the host populations based on religion, ethnicity, language etc, some
Eritrean refugees have informally and de facto been able to enjoy economic
and social rights nearly on par with Sudanese. They accessed economic and
social rights even though they formally did not have ‘the right to have rights’.
They own houses and access health care even though they are not supposed
to; they live in urban centres even though their mobility is supposed to be
restricted to designated zones; and by different means some have acquired
Sudanese nationality or residence permits. Those who have been able to enjoy
those rights have not repatriated to Eritrea when the causes for displacement
were no longer a threat to them. Those who did not realise those rights largely
returned (ibid.). In another example from one of the authors of this paper,
during 2006 work with Liberian refugees in Ghana, several displaced Liberians
explained they did not want to go back to Liberia because the unemployment
rate in the Ghanaian camp close to the capital was 30 per cent; in Liberia it
averaged 70 per cent. Formally they are not supposed to work without a work
permit, which few people have. Nonetheless, the reality is that they are
informally realising (and prioritising) their right to employment by giving up
formal citizenship rights that they would have, or at least are supposed to have,
in Liberia. By contrast, at the same time in 2006, Liberian refugees who had
been encamped in reputedly worse conditions in Guinea (Human Rights Watch
2002) were flocking home to what they hoped were a better realisation of rights
than what they were experiencing in displacement. UNHCR held up the closing
of Guinea camps as a shining example of successful refugee repatriation
(UNHCR 2006). However, from a displacement, actor-oriented perspective,
refugees’ agreement and want to move home was a strong sign that rights in
exile were not being realised. This voice was not heard, or at least not in media
representations.
Some authors talk about self-settlement, rather than camps, as well, as being a
way for displaced people (mostly refugees) to realise rights on their own. Van
Damme (1995) notes self-settlement success in Guinea, where villages that
welcomed refugees received international development and aid support.
Epidemics were fewer, especially in comparison to extreme examples like the
Goma camps in Zaire which experienced a cholera epidemic, which killed an
estimated 50,000 people. Yet, Van Damme ends his report on Guinea saying
that the ‘[m]ixing of refugees with the host population complicated targeting of
food aid intended only for refugees; consequently this liberal policy has been
changed and new arrivals are now concentrated in camps’ (1995: 360). Camps
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were, in the end, preferred for the sake of targeting and efficiency. The
question, then, here is which rights matter. This kind of self-settlement can
provide aid to whole communities in which displaced people settle. Though the
literature largely lacks a refugee voice, it lacks it here especially. Do refugees
want to be in camps or would they like to self-settle? Malkki’s classic Purity
and Exile (1995) describes two refugee situations: One, a camp in which
refugees actively claim ‘refugee-ness’ and ‘Hutu-ness.’ They see themselves
with an identity of categorical purity, while aid agencies see them as naked and
having lost their identity. The self-settled refugees in the townships refuse to be
categorised. Theirs is a ‘subversion of identification’ in which they ‘manage a
series of different identities.’ Both situations Malkki describes involve refugee
agency, whether that be to take on the narrative’s prescription wholeheartedly
or whether that be to defy all essentialising categories. They prove that they
are not just objects (blank slates to be written upon) but subjects ‘creating their
own refugee-ness’ (Malkki 1995: 3, 4, 11, 153, 235). Some prefer the refugee
label and encampment, seeing that as their way to get the rights they want,
especially in the way of affiliation with home country political voice. Others saw
self-settlement as the way to blend in, realising rights that citizens in the host
country were receiving – informal citizenship rights.
4.2 Protest
Mehta and Gupte (2003) have focused on displaced people as agents of
change as opposed to passive beneficiaries of welfare/aid/charity or victims.
The notion of refugees as ‘warrior communities’ has been put forward by Nyers
(2007). One recent and tragic example is the 2005 demonstration in Cairo,
which resulted in 28 deaths after three months of making claims to UNHCR.
One person at the protest said: ‘We live in a country of UNHCR’ (Moulin and
Nyers 2007). Along those lines one can see that ‘citizenship’ and its rights get
messy. Refugees in Cairo and elsewhere see UNHCR as the state which is the
provider of rights, and therefore direct protests to them rather than to states
(Harrell-Bond 2008). Can the ‘country of UNHCR’ provide citizenship rights? In
many situations refugees are right: UNHCR is the most likely entity to take any
action or to hear their voices on rights provision. UNHCR at least has remit for
rights advocacy, but whether they hear and then act on requests for change
from the refugee voices ‘from below’ is another question. See Box 4.3 for more
on the Cairo protest.
Another example of protest is of the 2008 protest in Ghana’s Buduburam
refugee settlement. Not wanting to accept what they felt was becoming a
forced repatriation without enough financial support to build a new life in
Liberia, and still holding onto hope of being resettled to the US, Liberian
refugees held a 5-week sit-in on a field next to the highway by the settlement.
At the end of the 5 weeks, Ghanaian authorities began arresting hundreds of
people, saying that some had been protesting naked (BBC 2008). Within days,
30 people had been deported, an action that violated refugee law and enraged
remaining refugees (International Herald Tribune 2008). Liberians see several
entities as the ensurer/provider of their rights. The Ghanaian state and UNHCR
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are two obvious ones, but many Liberians also see the United States
government as responsible for provision of their rights. Liberia’s history is one
of ‘founding’ by former US slaves, and some people in the refugee settlement
told Napier-Moore that Liberia is seen as the 51st US state. With that, they
hold hope that the US will come to the rescue, taking them in as refugees and
then as citizens. Real-politik, however, suggests otherwise, and their subjective
view of citizenship rights is very unlikely to be met by the US.
Box 4.3 2005 Sudanese protest in Cairo
In 2005 hundreds and then thousands of Sudanese refugees staged a
sit-in in downtown Cairo for three months. Their protest was against the
violations of their rights by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). Many saw local integration as problematic because
their rights to education, work, housing, lack of discrimination are
severely curtailed (FMRS 2006). Many were also angry about their
petitions and appeals for refugee status being rejected, leaving them
without any formal legal status. This mobilisation of refugees was
unprecedented and large. The demonstration ended on 30 December
2005, with a forced removal of all those protesting in the park in front of
the UNHCR office. The removal was brutal, and 28 Sudanese died. Many
were injured and arrested. Those with official papers were released
within a few days, but 600 without formal status remained in detention for
longer (FMRS 2006: 3). In this example of protest, the Sudanese
refugees in Egypt were caught between both the UNHCR and the
Egyptian state with both failing to deliver on the refugees’ basic rights.
They were also caught up in the politics of representation with their
leaders and local NGOs. This example highlights the increasing
contradictions between the vehicles/means to realise these rights
(i.e. through the host government or through the global agencies) and the
politics of representation.
A graphic and media-attracting angle to protest is that taken by Abas Amini, an
Iraqi asylum seeker in the UK, who sewed his eyes and mouth closed to point
to lack of rights, maltreatment and unjust denial of asylum from the UK Home
Office. Manifest also as a hunger strike, Amini attracted a further 100
protesters who gathered outside his residence (BBC 2004). Protesters in
Woomera detention centre in Australia also sewed their lips shut in 2003,
highlighting poor conditions and lack of rights in detention. Not all is well in ‘the
North’, as those not granted formal rights fight to attract attention to the
injustice.
Harrell-Bond (2008) and Sylvan (2005) describe many other protests from
displaced people. Harrell-Bond contends that protests have been going on as
long as displaced people have experienced rights violations. We only hear
more about them due to journalists increasingly picking up the stories. Sylvan’s
article starts off with a photograph of Sudanese refugees in Cairo defiantly
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withstanding Egyptian police water hoses, some with fists raised, and some
who had fallen to the ground showing peace signs with their hands. Among
other protests shown in her text, Sylvan (2005) describes Bhutanese refugees
marching peacefully in Nepal protesting their confinement to camps and lack of
right or ability to secure livelihoods. Many wanted repatriation and tried
marching home, but were stopped by Indian authorities as they passed through
Indian territory on the way. Harrell-Bond (2008) describes a poignant example
of conflicts in the application of citizen rights, when she talks of Sudanese
refugees working in camp schools alongside Ugandan nationals. Sudanese
were paid a pittance ‘incentive’ wage by UNHCR/its implementing partners,
while Ugandans paid a very different national wage. The Sudanese, with
support from Ugandan colleagues, formed a union in 1993. Both Sudanese and
Ugandan teachers went on strike over the wage differential in 1997, and
Sudanese were threatened with being fired from the job. Harrell-Bond rightly
accuses UNHCR for not following labour laws of host countries. Refugees want
and should be paid on par with citizens, under international and national law
requiring equal pay for equal work. These stories of public protest as a means
to secure rights are seemingly countless (see also Lewis 2006).
These examples demonstrate how displaced people are protesting and
questioning the top-down policy frameworks through which displacement,
repatriation, integration and resettlement are characterised and asserting their
right to have rights. Such examples abound all over the global south and north.
Still citizenship/displacement debates are rather top-down, ignoring the
importance of local agency and practice. We have seen in this section, then,
examples of displaced people realising their rights independently, or in spite, of
formal state legislated rights or restriction to rights. And, we have seen
examples of protest, when displaced people cannot realise rights informally
and instead experience violations from the state or international agencies.
4.3 Global-local rights claims through transnational alliances:
the cases of Tibet and Narmada
Falk describes a transnational citizen is an activist and an idealist, looking to ‘a
future to be created’ (1994: 139). Forced displacement is a powerful arena for
transnational citizens and struggle. We have already discussed the powerful
protests of Sudanese refugees in Cairo, Liberians in Ghana, Bhutanese in
Nepal, and Sudanese in Uganda. Currently fighting transnationally for both
rights in exile and for rights for fellow Tibetan ‘stayees’, Tibetans exiled across
the globe are following the Olympic torch and using its media attention to
enhance their claims and protest. The Government of Tibet in Exile (2005)
shows numbers of the population in exile at 110,170 when they conducted the
last census in 1998. Tibetans in exile are stateless, with few people holding
foreign passports and some with Indian registration certificates (ibid.). As many
Tibetans attempt protest against the Chinese government, ‘crackdowns’ and
detention are fierce in China and abroad. Yet, they have and have held the
attention of international media as well as NGO activists, especially with their
protests around the China 2008 Olympics. Protest from a wide Diaspora of
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stateless people, as well as from many non-Tibetan NGO allies and state
governments, might yet have impact in their struggle for what the Government
of Tibet in Exile calls for: ‘National Regional Autonomy as set forth in the
constitution of the People’s Republic of China by granting a meaningful
self-rule for all Tibetans under a single administration, which is in line with the
legitimate rights of all the minority nationalities’ (The Government of Tibet in
Exile 2008).
Another good example is transnational protest against large dams which Lyla
Mehta has both researched and engaged in for the past 18 years. The dams on
India’s Narmada River, apart from their high social and environmental costs,
are also famous due to the activities of the Narmada Bachao Andolan
(henceforth Andolan), one of the world’s most well known social movements.
Over the past 25 years, the Andolan has drawn the plight of the displaced
peoples affected by the Narmada dams and the dark sides of such top-down
projects to the attention of millions of people all over the world. The success of
high-profile resistance activities against displacement, such as those on the
Narmada dams, depends on transnational alliances of NGOs, campaigns and
movements. International human rights standards, as well as the policy
directives of international organisations, such as the International Labour
Organization (ILO) and the World Bank, are evoked and adapted to grant
salience to local struggles and campaigns. These informal mechanisms of
claiming rights and seeking accountability have been powerful agents of
change. They have led to cost and time overruns of the projects, even though
very few projects have officially been called off. Success has been both
symbolic and material. Even though many resisting oustees are still to receive
the compensation and rehabilitation, they are proud that they have been a part
of such a dynamic movement and gained a new awareness as citizens, both of
India and of the globe. As Noorjibhai, a villager from Mokhdi Maharashtra, told
Lyla Mehta in 2007:
If there had been no protest movement, nobody would have got anything.
At least now, many have received some land and compensation. I still
refuse to leave my ancestral home. The government is incapable of
providing us with just compensation. We are now aware of our rights as
citizens. We have waged battles in the streets of all the major cities and
our struggle has been taken to several countries of the world and
Washington. We will continue to fight for our rights.
Economic globalisation has in part led to the proliferation of demands for new
ways of making powerful actors, within and beyond the state, accountable for
the impacts of their actions on poor people (Goetz and Jenkins 2004: 28). But
economic globalisation has also led to the proliferation of new actors. In
Narmada, these include transnational alliances between the Andolan and
NGOs around the world (such as the International Rivers Network, the
Cornerhouse, UK, and Urgewald, Germany). These alliances have certainly
helped pressure global institutions, such as the World Bank, which now has an
Inspection Panel to investigate difficult and controversial projects. They also
led to the formation of the World Commission on Dams in 2000 and its
principles regarding decision-making processes around large dams. As Imhoff
et al. describe:
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Critics stepped up pressure on the Bank to commission a truly independent
dam review. In March 1997, participants at the first international conference
of dam-affected people, held in Curitiba, Brazil, called for an immediate
moratorium on all dam-building until a number of conditions were met. One
of these conditions was that an international, independent commission be
established ‘to conduct a comprehensive review of all large dams financed
or otherwise supported by international aid and credit agencies, and its
policy conclusions implemented. (2002: 5)
These transnational alliances are only possible due to increasing local-global
linkages. Today illegal flooding or submergence in the Narmada valley is met
with protest not just in Delhi and Bombay but also in Berlin and London.
However, the Narmada struggle remains an Indian struggle with transnational
dimensions and the battle is largely being waged with the Indian government,
just as the battle for self-rule is being fought against the Chinese government.
For the aforementioned refugee protests in the previous section, their battle is
also transnational. Sudanese refugees in Cairo, for instance, are fighting on
Egyptian soil for rights in Egypt or the right to be resettled by the UNHCR,
without even having their refugee status cleared. We have thus here looked at
several protests by refugees and asylum seekers, development-induced
displacees from Narmada, and stateless Tibetans in exile. All of them are
indeed transnational, either receiving attention and help from activists across
the globe, or by involving peoples who have crossed borders and are asking
for home and host states, and international agencies, to change policies. These
protests highlight citizenship rights not being realised. While protesting,
however, displaced people are doing what they can to informally realise as
many rights as possible. By sewing his lips together in the UK, Amani realises
his right to voice as he gets media attention. By gathering in a park for three
months, Sudanese refugees in Cairo realised some of the rights they were
demanding from UNHCR. Schafer writes:
While consistently demanding that the UNHCR and international
community give them ‘their rights’ and improve their situation, the sit-in
itself temporarily assuaged many of the hardships they faced. The park
was transformed into a relatively autonomous community of refugees who
created their own sense of security and provided mutual support and
solace for each other. The constant uncertainty and frustration associated
with life as a refugee was eased as they were able to take back some
control over their present lives (2006: 2).
Displaced people are creating new understandings of citizenship and are also
creating transnational alliances and governments in exile. They are informally
realising rights which states would deny them. While many displaced people do
not have formal citizenship, some fight for that formality, and others loudly
declare that having formal citizenship will not satisfy the rights they see most
important (see example of IDPs in Box 4.1). Many, like the Eritreans in Sudan
that Kibreab (2008) describes, are able to gain access to social and economic
rights that they see more important to their lives than the citizenship rights they
would have if they returned home to Eritrea. On the other hand, Tibetans in
exile are crying for self-rule, the ability to shape citizenship in Tibet as they and
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fellow Tibetan stayees want it. Informal rights realisation as well as demon-
strations and protests for formal rights realisation are the tools that displaced
actors are using across the globe.
5 Ignoring rights that displaced
people seek: social, economic and
cultural rights
Who is supposed to protect the rights of these ‘international orphans’ and those
crossing international borders? In principle, by ‘voting with their feet’ (Hathaway
1991: 120), refugees fleeing from oppressive state regimes and the abuse of
their human rights can expect protection from international law and from host
countries. Legislative frameworks (international laws, human rights laws,
legislations, conventions and treaties) embrace protection for refugees, based
on the framework of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and
specific conventions such as the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees. Under international law, states are obliged to protect non-citizens
and those residing within their national borders. They thus have a strong basis
for protection against persecution and abuse of their civil and political rights.
But their social, economic and cultural rights falling under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) remain very
neglected and include: the right to development and self-determination,11 the
right to food, health, education, participation and the right to livelihood more
generally. These rights are often viewed as ‘second generation’ rights and host
states are reluctant to award them to refugees, as we shall shortly
demonstrate.
Thus, in reality, refugees often cannot claim entitlements from host states who
deny them their basic rights and often abdicate responsibility to international
organisations. But the UNHCR, for instance, is not supposed to provide direct
assistance, and instead has a mandate to lobby for states to meet refugees’
rights. The UNRWA, which only works with displaced Palestinians, has the
opposite mandate. Under international law, states are obliged to protect
non-citizens and those residing within their national borders, including
refugees. But official duty-bearing states do not always step up to meet their
obligations – or meet them fully.
11 1986 General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development endorses individuals’ rights to
participate and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development to realise fundamental
human freedoms. This also includes the right to self-determination over the natural environment and
resources. The right to participation is drawn from the various articles of the International Bill of
Human Rights, and specifically ILO Convention 169. Similarly, the Right to Livelihood is founded in the
UDHR and articles 6 and 11 of the ICESCR (see Robinson 2003: 14).
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As discussed, the displacement and resettlement of IDPs, oustees and
refugees lead to several risks to basic civil, political social and economic rights.
Social and economic rights continue to be viewed as ‘second generation’
rights. The 1969 African Union Convention Governing Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, however, makes great strides forward in including
social and economic rights violations as causes for refugee flight and thus
refugee status in host countries. Nonetheless, leading forced migration
scholars, such as Hathaway, argue that there are some rights for refugees that
are immediate, whereas others are seen as progressive. Among those
progressive rights, he includes economic rights (Hathaway 2005). This view
however does not correspond to the experiences and perceptions of protection
of some displaced people. As we have discussed earlier in the paper, Kibreab’s
examination of the official refugee policy in Sudan, which constrains refugee
rights, juxtaposes it against the actual practice of Eritrean refugees gaining
access to socioeconomic rights. Eritrean refugees have gained a status
equivalent to permanent residence and enjoy most of their socioeconomic
rights on equal footing with nationals. Thus de jure citizenship is not as
important for Eritrean refugees in Sudan as long as they can access de facto
socioeconomic rights on equal footing with nationals (2003). In Egypt refugees
view citizenship as access to full protection. Due to the harsh economic
conditions and official policies of the Egyptian state, however, they are barred
from fully integrating in the host community. Instead, they are enacting and
claiming their socioeconomic rights in spite of the state (Grabska 2008).
As examples from Egypt (Box 4.3) and Sri Lanka (Box 4.1) demonstrate, social
and economic rights are multi-layered, making it difficult to separate legal
protection from economic and social realised rights. Thus, a narrow legalistic
definition of which rights are more immediate can feed into the biases of states
that claim that they lack the resources to protect the economic and social rights
of their citizens, let alone refugees.
However, why should states honour these commitments towards non-citizens
given that they honour existing obligations (such as the right to seek asylum)
with such reluctance? This question goes to the heart of what constitutes
membership to a country/community (see Grabska and Mehta 2008).
Conventionally, it is citizenship which facilitates this membership. However, as
Hathaway drawing on Walzer argues, while states have the right to exclude
non-citizens from membership in their country, viewing refugees as
‘necessitous strangers’ grants them special entitlements in a national
community (1991: 124). This calls for both:
… a limited and complex redistribution of membership and/or territory…
The same difficulty arises with regard to wealth and resources. These, too,
can be superfluous, far beyond what the inhabitants of a particular state
require for a decent life… [In these circumstances, members of the state]
could share their wealth with necessitous strangers outside their country or
with necessitous strangers inside their country.
(Walzer in Hathaway 1991: 125)
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This calls for states to extend conventional notions of membership to refugees
in order to protect a range of political and socioeconomic entitlements. These
issues go to the heart of citizenship which constitutes both civil and political as
well as social and economic rights. As Kabeer argues, ‘citizenship represents
rules which spell out the claims and obligations of membership in a given
community/society and ensure redistribution as a matter of right rather then
discretion’ (Kabeer 2005: 25). Citizenship is presented as a more inclusive
term, encompassing rights and obligations for those who experience exclusion.
In this view, citizenship encompasses ideas of adherence to some notion of
justice, whereby justice is conceptualised around when it is fair for people to be
treated the same and when it is fair that they should be treated differently
(ibid.). It also includes a demand for recognition not only of their personhood
but also of their difference.
Economic and social rights have different implications for IDPs and oustees.
For oustees at least, the protection on paper is more clear-cut. States that
force population groups to relocate clearly need to first avoid the likelihood that
oustees’ social and economic rights will be corroded. Secondly, if possible they
also need to enhance the socioeconomic status of oustees and help secure a
better standard of living for them, thus making ‘development’ a just process
that enhances the life choices of all. Consequently, there are now growing calls
for the need to link resettlement with wider developmental efforts. This explains
why the World Commission on Dams (2000) seeks to make hitherto losers
emerge as winners of dam projects, and key thinkers on resettlement issues,
such as Cernea, call for resettlement activities to be conceived and executed
as sustainable development programmes, providing sufficient investment
resources to give the persons displaced by the project the opportunity to share
in project benefits (Cernea 2000). Still, Lyla Mehta has demonstrated how
rights violations of Narmada dam oustees take place with impunity, even
though the oustees are full citizens of India and despite a dynamic protest
movement. This is due to sins of omission (i.e. the lack of awareness of rights
and the lack of resources to implement rights) or, more often, due to sins of
commission where rights are knowingly violated by powerful actors such as the
Indian government or the World Bank (see Mehta 2008).
6 Eurocentricism in literature,
taking away agency from
citizenship in the South
While several of the authors reviewed in previous sections of this paper call for
new understandings of citizenship, there are some striking Eurocentric biases
in conventional understandings of citizenship. Several authors seem to imply
that even though there are tremendous problems in Europe regarding the
conditions of refugees and immigrants, in non-Western countries the emphasis
on ethnic homogeneity is often stronger and the rights of citizenship are
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restricted. They are saying that in many regards Europe has figured out rights
and citizenship, but others have not. Castles and Davidson write: ‘A long
struggle lies ahead not only for the rights of minorities, but also to create
genuine citizenship for everybody’ (2000: xi). They go on to say:
… Conditions in large areas of the world – most of Africa, Central and
South Asia and parts of Latin America – are such that active citizenship
and transnational democracy seem almost out of reach. Citizenship
presupposes a functioning state, the rule of law and basic human rights
guarantees. All these are absent in countries that are home to the majority
of the world’s population… The struggle for democratic citizenship must
therefore have a global perspective, with the aim of creating the conditions
for full participation everywhere. Citizenship or chaos are the stark
alternatives at the beginning of the new millennium [emphasis added]
(2000: xii).
Brysk and Shafir (2004) distinguish between the ‘heartland of citizenship’
(developed Europe and North America) and ‘failed states’ in Africa and
elsewhere where weak and second class citizenship prevails and large
numbers of noncitizen refugees are in camps. The latter is probably the ‘chaos’
implied by Castles and Davidson; the former refers to so-called ‘liberal
capitalist democracies’ that are currently engaged in expanding interstate and
transnational rights and regulating global markets where noncitizens, migrants
and refugees are caught in the citizenship gap (Brysk and Shafir 2004).
These positions seem to suggest that people in the non-Western world have no
agency to participate, claim their rights or experience citizenship. It also implies
that the ‘right’ political institutions and structures (i.e. those of a mature liberal
democracy) are necessary to experience citizenship in a context of forced
migration. The Citizenship DRC would vehemently disagree with most of the
aforementioned positions. To argue that there are no citizenship rights in the
South disregards informal practices of citizenship and how groups move
between membership and exclusion, legitimacy and illegitimacy. It also
disregards formal rights that are different or valued differently from ‘Western’
norms. Such positions also create unhelpful distinctions between North and
South and hierarchies of citizenship. As pointed out by Sassen (2004), equal
citizenship is still a myth even in the US because groups defined by race,
ethnicity, and other identities still face exclusion. Much is written as well about
disengagement from participation in formal politics in western countries (The
Power Inquiry 2006; Hague and Harrop 2004).
Kibreab (2003) goes one step further. He argues that in Western countries
refugees are able to enjoy rights of citizenship either as naturalised citizens or
as denizens. As some of the examples in this paper show, this is not true all of
the time, mostly when asylum seekers are not granted refugee status but
cannot return home, as evidenced by protests in the UK and Australia.
Nonetheless, Kibreab contends that due to favourable living conditions,
refugees in Western countries tend to stay on and do not return home, even
when the unfavourable conditions that prompted displacement are eliminated.
By contrast, the structural factors in the South are such that refugees are often
unable to enjoy citizenship rights. Refugees, instead, in most parts of Africa are
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seen as temporary guests with no civil, political and social rights (2003).
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond (2005) describe a series of obstacles to refugee
integration in Uganda such as severe restrictions to their freedom of movement
and dispossessed of some of their property. According to the Ugandan
Constitution, refugees need to be resident for 20 years before they can be
naturalised (ibid.). In such conditions, Kibreab (2003) argues, refugees prefer
to return home even though the conditions may not be ideal. Kibreab however
revises this view and his later work in 2008 shows that for Eritreans in Sudan,
also, when rights are realised, refugees stay in countries of asylum. But, host
governments’ formal policies can prevent refugees from having access to
employment and income by virtue of being non-citizens.
While we would agree that some host governments in the South very often fail
to live up to their human right commitments towards refugees and displaced
people, it is important to bear in mind that today about four-fifths of the
refugees are hosted in southern countries (UNHCR 2009). It is largely
Southern governments that have to deal with massive cross-border refugee
movements, not the North. Northern governments have become increasingly
restrictive in admitting refugees. This is what Nobel has called an ‘arms race
against humanitarianism’ (Nobel 1988: 29–30, quoted in Malkki 1995). Yes,
when refugees are given refugee status in the North, they do often have very
good access to rights. But, most are not admitted when they apply. Take Iraq:
just one in six of Iraq’s refugees is allowed to remain in the UK. Out of 310
Iraqis who sought asylum in the UK in the second quarter of 2007, only 30
were allowed to stay on and a further 25 were given leave to remain (Observer,
7 October 2007: 7). Further, the eurocentrism which sees the North as having
solved human rights problems, has not incorporated the fact that many
Northern countries play a part in causing displacement; many of the world’s
refugee problems are due to superpower military and economic interventions.
Thus, Northern politics often contribute to refugee problems in the South, and
the North is increasingly refusing to deal with the direct impacts, i.e. not
accepting asylum claims of Iraqis who flee from their war-torn country.
Hathaway writes that though they did more so in the past, ‘[i]n recent years,
governments throughout the industrialised world have begun to question the
logic of routinely assimilating refugees, and have therefore sought to limit their
access to a variety of rights’ (2005: 3). This seems an understatement in a
world where only 25 of 310 petitioning Iraqis were given leave to remain in the
UK (in the second quarter of 2007). Hathaway notes ‘the failure of the
international community to establish an overarching supervisory mechanism for
the Refugee Convention of the kind now in place for virtually every other major
United Nations human rights treaty’ (2005: 13). Indeed, the international
community is not firmly bound to the treaty. In fact, Article 34 of the Refugee
Convention regarding naturalisation states the following:
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation
and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to
expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the
charges and costs of such proceedings.
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According to this soft international law, then, states should as far as possible
facilitate refugee citizenship. Hathaway states that ‘Art. 34 is not framed as a
strong obligation: it neither requires that state parties ultimately grant their
citizenship to refugees, nor that refugees accept any such offer made to them’
(2005: 981).
The Convention’s lack of strength regarding citizenship is visible in de facto
practice. Many in the EU, for instance, are currently propagating the myth of a
common Christian/humanist/anti-Muslim experience which is excluding and
propping up the notion of the ‘Other’ (especially for immigrants from non-
Christian countries such as Turkey and refugees from the non-Western world).
Moreover, as the case of the Bosnian refugees in Europe highlights, once a
European country is confronted by large numbers of refugees crossing a
shared border, it tends to get more restrictive. The usual argument in both the
North and South is ‘resource constraints’ of the host government and the
inability to provide for its own citizens, let alone refugees. However, research
suggests that this stance downplays the refugee’s ability to contribute to the
host economy. Refugees are not usually the poorest of the poor or the
unskilled. Refugees have and can contribute to the economies of their hosts,
but these skills are rarely utilised (Harrell-Bond 2002).
7 Are refugees the only true
transnational and/or global
citizens?
The consul banged on the table and said;
‘If you’ve got no passport you’re officially dead’:
But we are still alive, my dear, but we are still alive.
W. H. Auden (quoted in Malkki 1995: 495)
In this paper, we have demonstrated how displaced people are performing
citizenship, living citizenship, in situations where their own state and most often
their host state deny them citizenship rights. Given the way citizenship is
normally understood, we are left wondering ‘Is citizenship a useful concept for
exploring the problems of belonging, identity and personality in the modern
world?’ (Schotter quoted in Sassen 2004: 195). As reviewed above, the
migration/forced migration and citizenship literature have conceptualised some
new understandings of citizenship, calling them: external; multilayered or
multiple; territorially-defined or deterritorialising; denationalised; global, etc.
Some scholars argue that dual and multiple nationality will one day become the
norm (see Sassen 2004: 194). As demonstrated, when the state does not step
in, displaced people are either self-realising rights or they go beyond looking at
the host state as the sole duty bearer. They are creating lived multiple and
multilayered (i.e. beyond or beneath the state) citizenship experiences.
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Sorensen suggests the notion of membership, rather than citizenship, because
membership can be more multifaceted with several layers:
[C]itizenship is a straight forward category. One is either a citizen, or not,
of a particular state. Membership on the other hand is more convoluted; it
is not an all or nothing category. One can be more or less a member; one
can be a member in one aspect but not in another. Membership is
therefore a broader and more inclusive category than formal citizenship.
(Sorensen 1996: 76)
Earlier in the paper we looked at disruptions to territory, political space and
national concepts of citizenship and how displaced people are realising rights
informally where they are not granted citizenship’s right to have rights or when
they are caught between national and international jurisdictions. We looked at
protest and mobilisation efforts to have formal rights, and we saw transnational
alliances across global-local spaces. These actions from people making claim
to formal or to lived citizenship can be thought of as external citizenship, as
multilayered or multiple citizenship, as membership, as territorially-defined or
deterritorialised citizenship and as post- and de-nationalised citizenship. Each
of these concepts offers a way of explaining changes as well as projecting the
future of citizenship. Displaced people push the boundaries of the citizenship
concept, unsettling our norms, asking for change, and making change happen.
The concept of global citizenship presents yet another powerful recon-
ceptualisation of citizenship. It is one that is already made real through
displaced persons’ expressions of agency.
A historical look at ‘global citizenship’ includes Nansen passports, inter-
nationally recognised identity cards first issued by the League of Nations to
stateless refugees. They were designed in 1922 by Fridtjof Nansen (Holborn
1939), and 52 countries honoured them by 1942. The first refugee travel
documents, these passports are today recognised as one of the greatest
achievements of the now beleagered League of Nations. The World Service
Authority, a non-profit organisation that promotes ‘world citizenship’, issues a
‘World Passport’ (purportedly under the authority of Article 13, Section 1, of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights) in which 170 countries have stamped
visas (de facto acceptance), and of which six countries recognise it de jure
(Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Mauritania, Tanzania, Togo and Zambia) (World
Service Authority 2007).
In Nansen’s age, borders were not as tightly controlled, and the ‘refugee
problem’ concept was largely a European one. Global citizenship for refugees
could mean a return to the Nansen passport where refugees could be free to
travel to a range of countries. It could also mean that governments respect the
basic right of all individuals to a nationality. It could mean they adhere to
international standards and reduce ‘statelessness’ by facilitating acquisition of
nationality, allowing equal rights and registering every child at birth. These are
perhaps more formal aspects. At the informal level, it could be an increasing
presence, a multi-layered sense of belonging and rights claiming in global
institutions. Not only global institutions, but states should recognise the
‘multiple citizenships’ of peoples within its borders and of people who have left
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them. Communities and displaced individuals, of course, already experience
and ‘live’ these multiple citizenships, and many are asking for formal states and
institutions to formally recognise their rights as citizens.
Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, when
interviewed on global citizenship said that the foremost global citizens are
refugees (Schattle 2005: 124). Benequista and Levine identify three discourses
for global citizenship: ‘(1) a civic republican discourse that emphasises
concepts such as awareness, responsibility, participation and cross-cultural
empathy; (2) a libertarian discourse that emphasises international mobility and
competitiveness; and (3) a legal discourse that emphasises legal rights and
responsibilities of transnational actors’ (2006: 3). In forced migration debates,
all three discourses feature. In particular, attention has been paid to the civic
republican and legal discourses. These are generally views ‘from above’,
prioritising the civic republican discourse of moral responsibility (see Nussbaum
1996) towards an ‘other’; or the legal discourse, which is often a more statist
view. The libertarian discourse, on the other hand, which has an emphasis on
international mobility, has the potential to take into account views ‘from below’,
however, it only gets a meagre showing, if that – indicating global citizenship
has not been well defined in terms of international mobility – especially for
those displaced and forced to move. Further, international mobility in the
libertarian discourse usually refers to upper class expatriates (Schattle 2005)
rather than those forcibly displaced. What Malkki describes as a ‘sedentarist
metaphysics’ remains the bias. Can we move to a displacement lens or a
migrant metaphysics as our norm? The displaced are demanding rights through
protest and through international mobilisation. From an actor-oriented view of
citizenship, we have seen that displaced people are claiming what they see as
citizenship rights, or as much of them as they can, in a myriad of ways –
whether informal realisation locally or by demands to international entities
when states are unresponsive.
Would it be possible to transform the rights of forced migrants into a new form
of global citizenship – (i.e. membership in one or more political communities
with institutions for participation, distribution, and enforcement). Along with
others, we argue that multi-level citizenship may allow marginalised peoples,
displaced people included, to be able to enhance rights access by appealing to
levels above and below the state (Brysk and Shafir 2004: 212). The key
problem is the lack of accountability of key political actors at those different
levels. Take the refugee regime. States are not accountable to UNHCR, and
UNHCR is not accountable to refugees (as the example of Egypt highlights).
‘Who could monitor the monitor?’ ask Verdirame and Harrell-Bond referring to
absence of monitoring of UNHCR (2005: 17). In many cases, refugees do de
facto ‘live in a country of UNHCR’ without any citizenship rights, as the
Sudanese refugees in Cairo said. Their ‘lived’ citizenship starts with UNHCR.
And, so does their protest – as UNHCR becomes the main body against which
refugees protest. Similarly, development oustees are often caught between lack
of accountability from their own governments, private companies and the World
Bank which are all interested in large scale projects and programmes that
entail displacement and IDPs often flee from oppressive regimes within states
and lack the mechanisms to demand accountability.
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Noncitizens, refugees and other displaced people have little knowledge and
access to accountability mechanisms. Other problems of global institutions
include weak enforcement, excessive bureaucratisation, and corruption. But in
an era where asylum seekers are deported back to hostile situations, where
the global capital is displacing even more people (as is the case with recent
land grabs) and where states crack down on noncitizens and citizens under the
guise of the war on terror, multilevel citizenship could provide rights on different
geographical levels (local, district or urban, state, regional and global). This
would allow for national, subnational and supranational identities along with
different levels of loyalty. Global citizenship would be based on membership in
a global political institution, and the dilution of sovereignty could provide a
positive stimulus for enhanced civic engagement. International law should de
facto ensure the global right to rights.
‘In the world of nation-states, in an era of globalisation, people out of place will
always be at risk. While new forms of membership cannot yet grant them a
place, evolving institutions can give them greater voice and protection’ (Brysk
and Shafir 2004: 215). This needs appropriate global governance and getting
rid of unaccountable global decision making. Is it unrealistic to believe in global
institutions to uphold rights? Perhaps. Will countries, especially rich ones,
submit willingly to processes of global governance to open their doors to
strangers in need? Perhaps not. Despite our doubts concerning the feasibility
of global citizenship, we acknowledge that the displacement issue cannot be
addressed within the current paradigm of the nation-state. In sum, global
citizenship may be very hard to achieve in the next decades and millions of
displaced people may have to wait a long time for a Nansen type of passport.
However, these may be normative projects toward which to strive.
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